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L
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case

This case involves the use of a private road known as Shamrock Lane.
Shamrock Lane originates from a road known as Flat Creek Road and crosses private
real property owned by Appellant Clifton and Appellant Machado before reaching
individual parcels of real property owned by Respondent Ryan and Respondent Jones.
Clifton and Machado claim that Shamrock Lane is a private driveway and that Ryan and
Jones have no right to use Shamrock Lane to access their respective parcels of real
property. Ryan and Jones claim that they have an easement to cross Clifton and
Machado's real property via Shamrock Lane to access their respective parcels of real
property.

B.

Course of the Proceedings

Ryan and Jones have no material objection to the Course of the Proceedings as
articulated by Clifton and Machado in the Appellant's Brief on Appeal with the exception
that Clifton and Machado failed to include the following:
1.

On January 22, 2010, Clifton and Machado filed a Motion for New Trial
and/or to Open the Judgment, Take Additional Testimony, and Amend
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Direct Entry of a New
Judgment (R. Vol. 2, P. 386).
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2.

Pursuant to a Decision entered on May 28, 2010, the Court denied the
Motions described above (R. Vol. 2 P. 383).

3.

On July 8, 2010, Clifton and Machado filed a Notice of Appeal herein (R..
Vol 2, P. 399).

4.

On July 23, 2010, Clifton and Machado filed an Amended Notice of
Appeal herein (R.. Vol 2, P. 404).

5.

On July 28, 2010, Ryan and Jones filed a Notice of Cross Appeal herein
(R.. Vol 2, P. 411).

6.

On August 16, 2010, Ryan and Jones filed a Notice of an Amended Cross
Appeal herein (R.. Vol 2, P. 416).

C.

1.

Statement of the Facts

Pursuant to a Road Easement recorded on November 6, 1970 as Instrument No.
119025, records of Benewah County (hereinafter: "Road Easement"), Promised
Land and Cattle Company (hereinafter: "Promised Land"), as owner of certain
real property adjacent to the SE% of the SE% of Section 19, and other property
owners adjacent to Section 19, granted each other reciprocal access easements
over an existing logging road (Ryan Exhibit B).

2.

At the time the Road Easement was recorded, the easement originated at what
was then known as U.S. Alternate 95, now Highway 3, and traversed land owned
by Promised Land in Sections 20 and 29 in a westerly direction (Ryan Exhibit 8).
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Upon reaching land owned by Promised [_and in Section 30, the easement
turned to the south (Ryan Exhibit B). The easement was located generally just
south of Section 19 (Ryan Exhibit B).
3.

Pursuant to a Deed recorded on November 6, 1970, as Instrument No. 119026,
records of the Office of the Benewah County Recorder (hereinafter: "Timberland
Deed"), Promised Land conveyed the SE % of the SE % of Section 19 to
Timberland Resources, Inc. (hereinafter: "Timberland") (Ryan Exhibit C).

4.

The Road Easement and the Timberland Deed evidence that immediately prior
to the recording of the Timberland Deed, Promised [_and owned the SE % of the
SE % of Section 19 as well as the SE % of the SW% of Section 20, the E 1h of
the NE % of Section 30 and the NW% of the NW% of Section 29 (Ryan Exhibits
Band C).

5.

The Timberland Deed was recorded immediately after the Road Easement and
the two documents have consecutive Instrument Numbers (Ryan Exhibits Band
C).

6.

The location of the easement depicted in the Road Easement was modified in
1970 and 1971 by Montee Dickinson at the direction of Timberland. The
modified easement was moved partially into Section 19, and the easement was
developed into a road which ultimately became what is now known as Flat Creek
Road. (Tr. Vol I, P. 26. Ln 23-25; Tr. Vol. I, P. 28, l_n 1-18; Tr. Vol. I, P. 47, Ln. 7-
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8; Tr. Vol. I, P. 46. Ln. 18-19; Tr. Vol. I, P. 48, Ln. 9-16; Tr. Vol. I, P. 93, Ln. 2325; Tr. Vol. I, P. 100, Ln. 4-8; Tr. Vol. I, P. 102, Ln. 8-10; Tr. Vol. I, P. 120, Ln.
20-21; Tr. Vol. I, P. 121, Ln. 3-12; Tr. Vol. I, P. 407, Ln. 16-20; Tr. Vol. I, P. 539,
Ln. 8-14; Tr. Vol. 11, P. 1189, Ln. 17-25; Tr. Vol. 11, P. 1190, Ln. 1-15; Tr. Vol. 11,
P.1223, Ln.13-25; Tr. Vol. II, P.1224, Ln. 7-25; Tr. Vol. II, P.1225, Ln. 5-22)
7.

In addition to developing Flat Creek Road, Dickinson developed another road
which is now known as Shamrock Lane, at the direction of Timberland.
Shamrock Lane was developed to provide access to ten acre parcels Timberland
was selling. Shamrock Lane was completed in the Spring of 1971. (Tr. Vol. I, P.
405, Ln. 7-9; Tr. Vol. I, P. 406, Ln. 20-25; Tr. Vol. I, P. 407, Ln. 16-23; Tr. Vol. I,
P. 408, Ln. 15-17; Tr. Vol. I, P. 415, Ln. 14-25; Tr. Vol. I, P. 538, Ln. 17-21; Tr.
Vol. I, P. 539, Ln. 15-25; Tr. Vol. I, P. 540, Ln. 1-25; Tr. Vol. I, P. 541 Ln. 16-25;
Tr. Vol. I, P. 542, Ln. 1-11; Tr. Vol. I, P. 542, Ln. 16-"24; Tr. Vol. I, P. 543, Ln. 77-15; Tr. Vol. I, P. 544, Ln. 5-25; Tr. Vol. I, P. 545, Ln. 1-6; Tr. Vol. I, P. 571, Ln.
13-20; Tr. Vol. I, P. 572, Ln. 15-23).

8.

Dickinson received at least one ten-acre parcel of land from Timberland as
payment for developing Flat Creek Road and Shamrock Lane. (Ryan Exhibit E;
Tr. Vol. I, P. 541, Ln.16-25; Tr. Vol. I, P. 542, Ln.1-11). The only access to
Dickinson's ten-acre parcel was via the road now known as Shamrock Lane (Tr.
Vol. I, P. 426, Ln. 1-3; TR. Vol. I, P. 674, Ln. 15-17).
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9.

In 1971 Clarence Thomason drove to the Dickinson ten-acre parcel as directed
by Dickinson, and by using a map provided by Timberland, via Shamrock Lane.
The north/south portion of the road was an old road that had the brush and rock
removed from it by Dickinson, and the east/west portion of the road was a new
road pushed into the Ryan property by Dickinson. The entire road was 10-12
feet in width. (Tr. Vol. I, P. 543, Ln. 7-15; Tr. Vol. I, P. 544, Ln. 5-5-25; Tr. Vol. I,
P. 573, Ln. 7-22; Tr. Vol. I, P. 574, Ln. 20-25; Tr. Vol. I, P. 575, Ln. 1-5).

10.

The portion of Shamrock Lane which travels in a general northerly direction from
Flat Creek Road across the Clifton and Machado properties has been in
existence since approximately the 1950's and was observed and used by
Clarence Thomason since 1970. (Tr. Vol. I, P. 508, Ln. 21--25; Tr. Vol. I, P. 509,
Ln. 1-25; Tr. Vol. I, P. 510, Ln. 1-25, Tr. Vol. I, P. 511, Ln. 1-16; Tr. Vol. I, P. 561,
Ln. 19-25; Tr. Vol. I, P. 562, Ln. 9-12).

11.

A survey commissioned by Timberland conducted prior to August 1, 1971, was
recorded as Instrument No. 127599 in the records of the Benewah County
Recorder (hereinafter: "Timberland Survey") (Ryan Exhibit D). The Timberland
Survey reflects the location of Flat Creek Road as modified by Dickinson and
reflects the location of Shamrock Lane as built by Dickinson as private road
easements crossing the Clifton Property, the Machado Property, the Jones
Property and the Ryan Property (Ryan Exhibit D).
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12.

Jones drove a motor vehicle over and across Shamrock Lane to his property at
least three times in the Summer of 1972 and spent the night on his property, and
did the same at least five times in the Summer of 1974. (Tr. Vol. 1, P. 371, Ln. 825; Tr. Vol. I, P. 372; Tr. Vol. I, P. 373, Ln. 1-25; Tr. Vol. I, P. 376, Ln. 11-17; Tr.
Vol. I, P. 376, Ln. 17-18).

13.

Pursuant to a Deed executed on December 22, 1970, and recorded on May 20,
1982, in the Office of the Benewah County Recorder, Timberland conveyed the
E Yi of the SE% of the SE% of Section 19 to Richard W. Clifton (hereinafter: the
"Clifton Deed") (Ryan Exhibit G and Machado Exhibit 1 ).

14.

The Clifton Deed states that the conveyance is: "Subject to: easement of record
which allows joint usage of a road over and across the described property and
adjacent property which runs with the land ... " (Ryan Exhibit G and Machado
Ex~1ibit 1 ).

15.

Prior to his purchase of the property from Timberland, Clifton received a packet
of information from Timberland which was similar to the documents which Kris
Jones received from Timberland as described below (Tr. Vol. I, P. 107, Ln. 8-25;
Tr. Vol. I, Ln. 108, Ln. 1-7). The information Clifton received from Timberland
stated that Clifton's property would be accessed by a private road (Tr. Vol. I, P.
111, Ln. 8-11 ). The property which Clifton originally purchased are Tracts 7 and
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10 as depicted in the Timberland map (Ryan Exhibit MMM; Tr. Vol. I, P. 583, Ln.
7-21).
16.

Pursuant to a Deed executed on February 16, 1971, and recorded on July 31,
1978, in the Office of the Benewah County Recorder, Timberland conveyed the
NW% of the SE % of the SE % of Section 19 to Jones (hereinafter: the "Jones
Deed") (Ryan Exhibit F). The Jones Deed states: "Access to this property is by a
private road which extends from the public road and crosses this tract to provide
access to other lands in Section 19. The grantor reserves an easement for said
road across this tract for use by other landowners in this section." (Ryan Exhibit
F).

17.

Prior to purchasing his property, Jones received information in the form of sales
literature and maps from Timberland. The literature stated each parcel of
property in Section 19 that was sold by Timberland would have dedicated access
from a private road. The Timberland maps depict a proposed private road
providing access to the Jones and Ryan parcels in the approximate location of
Shamrock Lane (Ryan Exhibits KKK, LLL, MMM, NI\IN, 000, and PPP). The
property Jones purchased is depicted as Tract 8 on the Timberland map (Ryan
Exhibit MMM; Tr. Vol. I, P. 590, Ln. 18-25; Tr. Vol. I, P. 591, Ln. 1-21).

18.

Pursuant to a Deed executed on September 2, 1971, and recorded on
September 10, 1971, in the Office of the Benewah County Recorder, Timberland
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conveyed the SW % of the SE % of the SE % of Section 19 to Dickinson
(hereinafter: the "Dickinson Deed"). Dickinson is Ryan's predecessor in interest
(Ryan Exhibit E).
19.

The Dickinson Deed states: "Access to this property is by a private road which
extends from the public road. This road crosses this tract to provide access to
other lands, and the grantor reserves an easement for this road. The grantee
shall have the right to use said road but shall not block the same and shall leave
the same clear for use by other landowners" (Ryan Exhibit E). The property
acquired by Dickinson is depicted as Parcel 9 on the Timberland map
(Ryan/Jones Exhibit MIVIM).

20.

Pursuant to a Deed recorded on May 20, 1982, in the Office of the Benewah
County Recorder, Clifton conveyed the S Yz of the SE % of the SE 1". of the SE %
of Section 19 to Ronald Leroy Bernhardt (hereinafter: "Bernhardt Deed") (Hyan
Exhibit H).

21.

Pursuant to a Deed recorded on November 13, 1993, in the Office of the
Benewah County Recorder, Bernhardt conveyed the S Yz of the SE % of the SE

% of the SE % of Section 19 to B.R. West and Florence West (hereinafter: "West
Deed") (Ryan Exhibit I). Having sold a portion of his property to Bernhardt as
described above, and to Machado as described below, Clifton is the current
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owner of the N Yz of the SE % of the SE% of the SE % of Section 19
(hereinafter: the "Clifton Property").
22.

Dickinson sold his parcel of property to John and Jennifer Moak pursuant to a
Deed executed on August 13, 1976 (Ryan Exhibit RRR).

23.

Clarence Thomason and Chris Thomason visited the Flat Creek Road area in
1970, purchased land on Flat Creek Road in 1971, and moved to the property
located on Flat Creek Road in 1979 (Tr. Vol. I, P. 403, Ln. 22-25; Tr. Vol. I, P.
404, Ln. 1-19; Tr. Vol. I, P. 536, Ln. 19-25; Tr. Vol. I, P. 537, Ln. 14-25; TR Vol.
I, P. 546, Ln. 1-7). Since 1971 Clarence Thomason and Chris Thomason have

driven motor vehicles, herded cattle, hunted, ridden horseback, and ridden
snowmobiles and ATV's over and across Flat Creek Road and Shamrock Lane
(Tr. Vol. I, P. 407, Ln. 1-11; Tr. Vol. I, P. 408, Ln. 4-6; Tr. Vol. I, P. 415, Ln. 14··
25; Tr. Vol. I, P. 419, Ln. 3-25; Tr. Vol. I, P. 420, Ln. 1-20; Tr. Vol. I, P. 546, Ln.
8-17; Tr. Vol. I, Ln. 1-14).
24.

With the assistance of Chris Thomason, the Moaks moved a mobile home onto
what is now the Ryan Property in 1976 via Shamrock Lane (Tr. Vol. I, P. 422, Ln.
1-25; Tr. Vol. I, P. 423, Ln. 1-25; Tr. Vol. I, P. 424, Ln. 1-3). During the period of
time w~1ich the Moak's owned the Ryan property, three different mobile homes
were placed in the property, one as large as sixty feet in length (Tr. Vol. I, P. 566,
Ln. 17-25; Tr. Vol. I, P. 567, Ln. 1-19). The Moak's lived on the Ryan Property
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year round and John Moak Jr. drove in motor vehicles over and across
Shamrock Lane to access the Moak residence (Tr. Vol. 1, P. 670, Ln. 4-9; TR.
Vol. I, P. 670, Ln. 14-17). Shamrock Lane was the only access road into and out
of the Moak home site (Tr. Vol. I, P. 425, Ln. 18-25; Tr. Vol. I. P. 426, Ln. 1-3).
Chris Thomason drove a motor vehicle to the Moak residence over Shamrock
Lane (Tr. Vol. I, P. 424, Ln. 17-25; Tr. Vol. 1, P. 551, Ln. 14-25). After the
Moak's placed the mobile home on the real property, Clarence Thomas used his
equipment to smooth out Shamrock Lane for the Moak's and helped John Moak
Sr. when his vehicle became stuck (Tr. Vol. I, P. 551, Ln. 1-14).
25.

Clarence Thomas saw the Moak's drive motor vehicles over and across
Shamrock Lane to access their residence on many occasions (Tr. Vol. I, P. 551,
Ln. 24-25; Tr. Vol. I, P. 552, Ln. 1-2). Robert Loe visitf~d the Moak residence
eight times between the years 1980 to 1986 by driving a motor vehicle over and
across Shamrock Lane (Tr. Vol. I, P. 634, Ln. 15-18; Tr. Vol. 1, P. 636, Ln. 1521; Tr. Vol. I, P. 637, Ln. 10-23; Tr. Vol. I, P. 641, Ln. 12-21; TR. Vol. I, P. 663,
Ln. 7-12).

26.

During the Moak's absence, Robert Loe checked on the status of the property of
three occasions (Tr. Vol. I, P. 636, Ln. 15-20; Tr. Vol. I, P. 637, Ln. 4-11). During
the Moak's absence, Clarence Thomason cared for the Moak's dog and checked
on the Moak's residence (Tr. Vol. I, P. 550, Ln. 2-10; Tr. Vol. I, P. 568, Ln. 12-25;
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Tr. Vol. I, P. 569, Ln. 1-9). During the Moak's absence, the Moak residence was
checked by Deputy Keith Wilson several times at the request of the Moak's (Tr.
Vol. 1, P. 528, Ln. 23-25; TR. Vol. I, P. 529, Ln. 1-25; Tr. Vol. I, P. 530, Ln. 113). During the Moak absence, John Moak Jr. checked on the status of the
Moak residence at his father's request (Tr. Vol. I, P. 673, Ln. 1-7).
27.

John Moak returned to the Ryan property after an approximately one year
absence (Tr. Vol. I, P. 428, Ln. 6-22) and Jennifer Moak (Mensch) sold the
property to Ryan pursuant to a Deed recorded on February 23, 1989, in the
Office of the Benewah County Recorder (Ryan/Jones Exhibit J). Ryan quit
claimed their interest in the Ryan Property to The Charles and Carolyn Ryan
Trust. Said Trust is the current legal owner of the Ryan Property (Ryan/Jones
Exhibits DD and EE).

28.

After purchasing the Ryan property, Ryan cleared wrecked vehicles and the
structures from the property, placed recreation vehicles upon the property,
cleared a building site on the property, improved and maintained Shamrock
Lane, plowed snow from Shamrock Lane, had a wel! dug, had a waterline put in
the ground from the well to the residence, built a house on the property, cleared
a site for a shop on the property, built a shop on the property, resided upon the
property, continually used the property and exclusively used Shamrock Lane to
accomplish all of the above tasks (Ryan Exhibit YY; Ryan Exhibit XX; Tr. Vol II,
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P. 831, Ln. 12-25; Tr. Vol 11, P. 832, Ln. 1-25; TR. Vol 11, P. 833, Ln. 1-25; Tr. Vol
11, P. 836, Ln. 13-25; TR. Vol 11, P. 837, Ln. 24-25; Tr. Vol. 11, Ln. 838, Ln. 1; Tr.
Vol II, P. 838, Ln. 13-25; Tr. Vol. II, P. 840, Ln. 1-18; Tr. Vol. 11, P. 842, Ln. 1-13;
Tr. Vol. 11, P. 845, Ln. 11-25; Tr. Vol. 11, P. 846, Ln. 8-14; Tr. Vol II, P. 850, Ln.
14-25; Tr. Vol 11, P. 851, Ln. 1-9; Tr. Vol II, P. 855, Ln. 1-25; TR. Vol II, P. 856,
Ln. 1-8; Tr. Vol II, P. 856, Ln, 19-25; Tr. Vol 11, P. 859, Ln. 1-25; Tr. Vol II, P. 869,
Ln. 1-25; Tr. Vol II, P. 861, Ln. 1-25; Tr. Vol II, P. 865, Ln. 8-12; Tr. Vol 11, P. 866,
Ln. 9-15; Tr. Vol II, P. 868, Ln. 6-20; Tr. Vol. II, P. 869, Ln. 11-25; TR. Vol 11, P.
1043, Ln. 1-12).
29.

Pursuant to a Deed recorded on September 28, 2006, in the Office of the
Benewah County Recorder, Clifton conveyed the NE% of the SE % of the SE %
of Section 19 to Machado (hereinafter: the "Machado Deed") (Ryan Exhibit K).
The Machado Deed states, "... said premises is free from all encumbrances
except. .. easements of records and easements visible upon the premises ... "
(Ryan Exhibit K).

30.

When Machado purchased the Machado Property, he obtained a title insurance
policy (Machado Exhibit 52). Exclusion No. 3 of Machado's title insurance policy
excluded easements not shown of record (Machado Exhibit 52). Exclusion No. 8
of the title insurance policy to the Machado Property also specifically excluded
the provisions in the deed from Timberland to Clifton (Machado Exhibit 53; Ryan
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Exhibit G). When Machado purchased the Machado Property, Machado was
aware of the existence of Shamrock Lane, was aware that Ryan was living at the
end of Shamrock Lane, and knew that Ryan was crossing the Machado Property
via Shamrock Lane Property to access the Ryan Property (Tr. Vol. I, P. 273, Ln.
13-25; Tr. Vol. I, P. 274, Ln. 9-25; Tr. Vol. I, P. 275, Ln. 1-16; Tr. VoL I, P. 279,
Ln. 10-25; Tr. Vol. I, P. 280, Ln. 1-9).
31.

On January 8, 2007, a Record of Survey, commissioned by Machado, was
recorded at Book 5 Page 129, Instrument No. 245390, in the Office of the
Benewah County Recorder (hereinafter: the "Machado Survey") (Ryan Ex~1ibit V).
The Machado Survey depicts a road known as Shamrock Lane and a road
known as Flat Creek Road (Ryan Exhibit V). The reserved private roarl
easements depicted on the Timberland Survey are located on or near Shamrock
Lane and Flat Creek Road as depicted on the Machado Survey (Ryan Exhibits D
and V).

32.

The Jones Property is landlocked. Without an easement over and across the E

Yi of the SE % of the SE% of Section 19, Jones has no reasonable way to
access his property.
33.

Ryans have oriented their residence in conformity with the location of Shamrock
Lane (Tr. Vol. 11, P. 1027, Ln. 23-25; Tr. Vol. II, P. 1028, Ln. 1-3). Building a new
road as proposed by Machado from Flat Creek Road would access the Ryan
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"bone yard" and shop, not the Ryan residence (Tr. Vol. II, P. 1026, Ln. 25; Tr.
Vol. II, P. 1027, Ln. 1-10). The proposed access would require building a new
road approximately 485 feet in length, would require between 1,200 and 4,000
cubic yards (between 120 and 400 dump truck loads) of fill material because of a
steep slope, would require the removal and relocation of a power pole and the
removal of timber from the Ryan Property, and would require the installation of a
culvert with additional fill material (Tr. Vol. 11, P. 1025, Ln. 18-25; Tr. Vol. 11, P.
1026, Ln. 1-25; Tr. Vol. 11, P. 1249, Ln. 1-25; Tr. Vol. 11, P. 1264, Ln. 21-22; TR.
Vol II, P. 1273, Ln. 20-25; Tr. Vol. II, P. 1274, Ln. 1-20; Tr. Vol. 11, P. 1275, Ln. 512; Tr. Vol. II, P. 1280, Ln. 12-14; Tr. Vol. II, P. 1305. Ln. 24-25; Tr. Vol. 11, P.
1306, Ln. 1-25).
34.

The vertical drop from Flat Creek Road at the location of the proposed road to
the Ryan residence is approximately 40 feet over a 400 foot distance. The
proposed road would necessitate a sweeping switchback. The height of the fill
for the proposed alternative access road would be 20 feet off the native ground
for a length of 100 feet. The base of the fill would be 40 feet wide for a 14 foot
wide roadway surface. The width of ttie fill slope at the culveii would be 35 feet
for a distance of 40 feet. The estimated cost of the construction of the road
proposed by Machado is $22,368.07. This cost does not include the removal
and replacement of the power pole nor the placement of a culvert (Tr. Vol. II, P.
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1252, Ln. 22-24; Tr. Vol. II, P. 1261, Ln. 6-11; Tr. Vol. 11, P. 1300, Ln. 1-25; Tr.
Vol. II, P. 1301, Ln. 1-25; Tr. Vol. 11, P. 1302, Ln. 1-19; TR. Vol. 11, P. 1306, Ln.
10-23; Tr. Vol. 11, P. 1305, Ln. 15-25).
35.

An access road leading to the Ryan shop and not their residence as proposed by
Machado would have a negative impact of the value of the Ryan Property (Tl1.
Vol. 11, P. 1028, Ln. 4-25; TR. Vol. 11, P. 1029, Ln. 1-25).

36.

There is a significant amount of snowfall in the Flat Creek/Shamrock Lane area
which necessitates snow removal from Shamrock Lane. The snow banks reach
as high as five feet. Ryan has historically moved snow up to 20 feet off of
Shamrock Lane. It is necessary that a snow removal easement on either side of
Shamrock Lane be permitted (Ryan Exhibit AAA; Tr. Vol. II, P. 885, Ln. 12-23;
Tr. Vol. 11, P. 889, Ln. 4-16; Tr. Vol. II, P. 983, Ln. 15-25).

11.
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

The District Court's finding that Ryan and Jones have an implied easement by
necessity is supported by substantial and competent evidence.

2.

The District Court's finding that Ryan and Jones have an express easement is
supported by substantial and competent evidence.

3.

The District Court's finding of the width of easement and the snow removal
easement is supported by competent evidence.

4.

The District Court erred in failing to rule on the claims of prescriptive easement
and easement implied by prior use.
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111.
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

Ryan and Jones seek an award of attorney fees and costs herein pursuant to
Idaho Code§ 12-121.
In Suhadolnik v. Pressman, 37526 (IDSCCI) May 25, 2011, this Court recently
stated:
"Idaho Code§ 12-121 permits an award of attorney fees in a civil action to
the prevailing party if the court determines the case was brought, pursued
or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Newberry,
142 Idaho at 292-93, 127 P.3d at 195-96.
Clifton knew his property was not located in Section 19 and he knew that his
property was encumbered by a private road easement to benefit adjacent property.
The adjacent property at the time of execution of Clifton's Deed was owned by
Timberland. Said property was later conveyed by Timberland to Dickinson and Jones.
Clifton's claim herein that his property is not encumbered by an easement which
bene"fits Ryan and Machado is frivolous, unreasonable and without foundation.
At the time Machado purchased his property from Clifton that Shamrock Lane
existed, that Shamrock Lane crossed his property, and that Ryan was using Shamrock
Lane as to sole access to the Ryan Property. Machado's Deed specifically excluded
easements of view. Machado's title insurance specifically excepted the easement as
described in Clifton's Deed. Machado's claim herein that his property is not
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encumbered by an easement which benefits Ryan and Machado is frivolous,
unreasonable and without foundation.
Clifton and Machado have proposed herein that Ryan and Jones should access
their respective property via the "power pole road," a road that their expert witness
called an old skid trail that was too steep to use as a road. Clifton and Machado's claim
herein that Ryan and Jones should access their respective property via the ''power pole
road" is frivolous, unreasonable and without foundation.
Clifton and Machado's claim herein that there is a lack of substantial and
competent evidence relative to the historical width of Shamrock Lane is frivolous,
unreasonable and without foundation.
Clifton and Machado's claim herein that there is a lack of substantial and
competent evidence relative to the necessity to remove snow from Shamrock Lane, and
the area necessary to accomplish the same is frivolous, unreasonable and without
foundation.
It is respectfully requested that this Court award Ryan and Jones their attorney
fees and costs on appeal.
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IV.
ARGUMENT
A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
In Caldwell v. Cometto, 37157 (IDSCCI), May 26, 2011 this Court recently
articulated the standard of review in a case involving an easement:
This Court reviews the trial court's findings after a bench trial for clear
error. I.R.C.P. 52(a). "A trial court's findings of fact in a bench trial will be
liberally construed on appeal in favor of the judgment entered, in view of
the trial court's role as trier of fact." Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57,
61, 190 P.3d 876, 880 (2008) (quoting Anderson v. Larsen, 136 Idaho
402, 405, 34 P.3d 1085, 1088 (2001 )). Factual findings will be upheld if
supported by substantial, competent evidence, even if the parties
presented conflicting evidence at trial. Griffin v. Anderson, 144 Idaho
376, 378, 162 P.3d 755, 757 (2007). By contrast, this Court freely reviews
issues of law. Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 506, 65 P.3d 525, 528
(2003).

B.
1.

The District Court's finding that Ryan and Jones have an implied
easement by necessity is supported by substantial and competent
evidence

In Cordwell v. Smith, 105 Idaho 71,665 P.2d 1081 (Ct. App. 1893) the Idaho
Court of Appeals stated:
We turn next to appellants' assertion that they have an implied easement
by "way of necessity." Such necessity can arise when the owner of land
conveys part thereof to another, and the part conveyed is without ingress
or egress except over the lands retained. Wagner v. Fairlamb, supra;
Martinov. Fleenor, 148 Colo. 136, 365 P.2d 247 (Colo.1961). The Idaho
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Supreme Court, quoting from Martino, and from 17A Am. Jur. 668-69,
Easements, § 58, said in Burley Brick & Sand Company v. Cofer, 1
Idaho 333, 335, 629 P.2d 1166, 1168 (1981):
Although a way of necessity is sometimes confused with an easement
arising, on severance of title, from a pre-existing use, there is a definite
distinction between them, mainly because a way of necessity does not
rest on a pre-existing use but on the need for a way across the granted or
reserved premises. A way of necessity is an easement arising from an
implied grant or implied reservation; it is a common-law origin and is
supported by the rule of sound public policy that lands should not be
rendered unfit for occupancy or successful cultivation. Such a way is the
result of the application of the presumption that whenever a party conveys
property, he conveys whatever is necessary for the beneficial use of that
property and retains whatever is necessary for the beneficial use of land
he still possesses. Thus, the legal basis of a way of necessity is the
presumption of a grant arising from the circumstances of the case. This
presumption of a grant, however, is one of fact, and whether a grant
should be implied depends upon the terms of the deed and the facts in
each particular case.
A way of necessity arises where there is a conveyance of a part of a tract
of land of such nature and extent that either the part conveyed or the pctrt
retained is entirely surrounded by the land from which it is severed or by
this land and the land of strangers. It is a universally estahlished principle
that where a tract of land is conveyed which is separated from the
highway by other lands of the grantor or surrounded by his lands or by his
and those of third persons, there arises, by implication, in favor of the
grantee, a way of necessity across the premises of the grantor to the
highway.
Thus, appellants here had the burden of proving they met three
requirements: 'first, that their properties were once part of the larger tract
held under one ownership prior to a division of the tract; second, that a
necessity for the roadway existed at the time of the severance; and third,
that the present necessity for the particular right-of-way is great. Close v.
Rensink, supra, Wagner v. Fairlamb, supra, 379 P.2d at 168; Martino
v. Fleenor, supra, 365 P.2d at 249.
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The first requirement set forth above has been met. The evidence and testimony
demonstrate that the Ryan, Jones, Clifton and Machado properties were at one time all
part of a large tract of land owned by Timberland prior to the division of the respective
parcels from the larger tract.
The evidence and testimony demonstrate that a necessity for Shamrock Lane
existed at the time of the severance. The Jones property is landlocked without having
the use of Shamrock Lane and Jones has no access to his pror,erty other than via
Shamrock Lane. Access to the Ryan property via Shamrock Lane at the time of the
severance existed because it is was not possible to access the Ryan Property at the
time of the severance without using Shamrock Lane. Therefore, the second
requirement set forth above has been met.
The present necessity for the use of Shamrock Lane for Ryan and Jones to
access their respective properties is great. As slated above, other than Shamrock
Lane, Jones has no means to access his property. While Flat Creek Roacf does cross
the extreme south east corner of the Ryan property, Ryan cannot drive off of Flat Creek
Road onto the Ryan property due to the extremely steep slope of the Ryan property in
the immediate vicinity of Flat Creek Road. Machado claims that Ryan can access his
property via the "power pole road" from Flat Creek Road. Machado's own expert
witness testified that the alleged "power pole road" was" ... an old skid trail type deal."
(Tr. Vol. II, P. 1257, Ln. 10-12), "... about a 30-35 percent slope." (Tr. Vol. II, P. 1263,
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Ln. 6-7), that he would not use any portion of the "power pole road" to construct a new
road "Because the skid trail is too steep" (Tr. Vol. 11, P. 1264, Ln. 17-24), "It really would
not be a good road" (Tr. Vol. 11, P. 1265, Ln. 1-2), that "You don't even want to go down
that" (Tr. Vol. II, P. 1265, Ln. 9-10). Furthermore, as set forth in the Statement of Facts
herein, actually building a road from Flat Creek would require the removal and relocation of the power pole, would require an unreasonable amount of fill material, an
unreasonable disruption of the Ryan property, unreasonable cost and negatively affect
the property value of the Ryan property. In addition, the creation of a road from Flat
Creek Road to the Ryan property would result in an unsafe intersection on Flat Creek
Road due to the steep grade of Flat Creek Road and a curve on Flat Creek Road at
said location (Tr. Vol. II, P. 998, Ln. 16-25; Tr. Vol. 11, P. 999, Ln. 9-25; Tr. Vol. II, P.
1000, Ln. 1-3). Conversely, Shamrock Lane intersects with Flat Creek Road on a flat,
wide, straight portion of Flat Creek Road that provides superior line of sight and safety.
(Tr. Vol. II. P. 1000, Ln. 4-15). Therefore, Ryan's present necessity to use Shamrock
Lane is great.
Substantial and competent evidence supports that Court's finding that Ryan and
Jones have an Easement Implied by Necessity over the Clifton property and the
Machado property via Shamrock Lane to access their respective properties.
2.

The District Court's finding that Ryan and Jones have an express
easement is supported by substantial and competent evidence
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Idaho Code § 55-603 states:
A transfer of real property passes all easements attached thereto, and
creates in favor thereof an easement to use other real property of the
person whose estate is transferred, in the same manner and to the same
extent as such property was obviously and permanently used by the
person whose estate is transferred, for the benefit thereof, at the time
when the transfer was agreed upon or completed.
In Ponderosa Homesite Lot Owners v. Garfield Bay Resort, lnc.143 Idaho

407, 146 P.3d 673 (2006), this Court stated:
... [U]under Idaho law a dedication, whether express or common law,
creates an easement. Moreover, an easement does not divest the
servient estate owner of title. See Luce v. Marble, 142 Idaho 264, 273,
127 P.3d 167, 176 (2005) (citing Drew v. Sorensen, 133 Idaho 534,
541,989 P.2d 276,283 (1999); Viebrock v. Gill, 125 Idaho 948,953,
877 P.2d 919, 924 (1994)); Abbott v. Nampa Sch. Dist. No. 131, 119
Idaho 544, 548, 808 P .2d 1289, 1293 (1991 ). Nor does the creation of an
easement divest the servient estate owner of the ability to transfer title.
See Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 641-42, 991 P.2d 362, 366-67
(1999) (stating it is equitable to impose an easement on a buyer who
already had notice of its existence); Checketts v. Thompson, 65 Idaho
715, 721, 152 P.2d 585,587 (1944) (quoting 28 C.J.S. Easements§ 48)
("One who purchases land expressly subject to an easement, or with
notice, actual or constructive, that it is burdened with an existing
easement, takes the land subject to the easement.").
In Akers v. D.L. White Construction, Inc., 142 Idaho 293,127 P.3d 1
this Court stated:
An easement is the right to use the land of another for a spt~cific purpose
that is not inconsistent with the general use of the property by the owner.
Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 229, 76 P.3d 969, 973 (2003). "One
who purchases land expressly subject to an easement, or with notice,
actual or constructive, that it is burdened with an existing easement, takes
the land subject to the easement." Checketts v. Thompson, 65 Idaho
715,721,152 P.2d 585,587 (1944). An express easement may be by

-22-

(2005),

way of reservation or by exception. 7 THOMPSON ON REAL
PROPERTY, THOMAS EDITION§ 60.03(a)(2)(1) (David A. Thomas ed.,
1994). An express easement by reservation reserves to the grantor some
new right in the property being conveyed; an express easement by
exception operates by withholding title to a portion of the conveyed
property. Id.
In Benninger v. Derifield, 129 P.3d 1235, 142 Idaho 486 (2006), this Court
stated:
The legal effect of an unambiguous written document must be decided by
the trial court as a question of law. If, however, the instrument of
conveyance is ambiguous, interpretation of the instrument is a matter of
fact for the trier of fact. Latham v. Garner, 105 Idaho 854, 673 P.2d 1048
(1983). In interpreting and construing deeds of conveyance, the primary
goal is to seek and give effect to the real intention of the parties. Neider v.
Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 65 P.3d 525 (2003); C & G, Inc. v. Rule, 135
Idaho 763, 25 P.3d 76 (2001). If the language of a deed is plain and
unambiguous, the intention of the parties must be ascertained from the
deed itself and extrinsic evidence is not admissible. Simons v. Simons,
134 Idaho 824, 11 P.3d 20 (2000). Uncertainties should be treated as
ambiguities; such ambiguities are subject to be cleared up by resort to the
intention of the parties as gathered from the deed, from the circumstances
attending and leading up to its execution, from the subject matter, and
from the situation of the parties at the time. City of Kellogg v. Mission
Mountain Interests, 135 Idaho 239, 16 P .3d 915 (2000). As it concerns
the creation of an easement, the Idaho Court of Appeals has suggested
that:
[A]n easement may be created by way of exception or by
reservation .... No particular forms or words of art are
necessary; it is necessary only that the parties make clear
their intention to establish a servitude. Regardless of the
terms used, courts generally will attempt to ascertain the
intention of the parties by referring not only to the language
of the deed, but also to the circumstances attending the
transaction and the condition of the property. Seccombe v.
Weeks, 115 Idaho 433, 436, 767 P.2d 276, 279
(Ct.App.1989), disapproved of on other grounds, Rodriguez
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v. Oakley Valley Stone, Inc., 120 Idaho 370,378, 816 P.2d
326, 334 (1991 ).
Pursuant to a Deed recorded November 6, 1970, Promised Land conveyed the
SE % of the SE % of Section 19, and other adjoining lands to Timberland. Although the
conveyance from Promised Land to Timberland does not contain a specific grant of an
easement, the language of Idaho Code§ 55-603 cited above, creates, as a matter of
law, connecting easements for access over and across the SE % of the SE % of
Section 19.
It should come as no surprise that on the same date the conveyance of the SE %
of the SE% of Section 19 from Promised Land to Timberland was recorded, the Road
Easement, which had been executed by Promised Land, was also recorded. The Road
Easement allowed Timberland to access the SE % of the SE % of Section 19 by
traveling over and across the remainder of Promised Land's real property, and the real
property of the other signatories to the Road Easement. The Road Easement is in the
approximate location of what is now known as Flat Creek Road.
Jones purchased ~1is real property as the result of being solicited by Timberland.
Prior to his purchase, Timberland provided Jones with literature describing the real
property at issue herein, as well as a map depicting the real property at issue herein.
The literature stated that access to each parcel would be by a private road, and the
map depicted the location of a private road to provide access to the Ryan and Jones
properties. The private road depicted on the Timberland map is in the approximate
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location of Shamrock Lane. There is substantial and competent evidence that
Timberland intended to create easements to each parcel.
In the Spring of 1971, Chris Thomason rode his motorcycle over the roads now
known as Flat Creek Road and Shamrock Lane. Monty Dickinson was employed by
Timberland and received a parcel of land from Timberland (now the Ryan property), for
the work he did putting in the roads. Monty Dickinson solicited Chris Thomason's
father, Clarence Thomason to purchase the property that is now owned by Ryans. In
showing the property, Monty Dickinson advised Clarence Thomason to use Shamrock
Lane to access the parcel.
In addition to the facts set forth above, which demonstrate substantial and
competent evidence of Timberland's intention to create easements, the division of the
SE % of the SE % of Section 19 by Timberland via deeds, and the language contained
within said deeds as described below, clearly establishes by substantial and competent
evidence that Ryan and Jones have an express access easement over and across
other land within the SE% of the SE % of Section 19.
The Road Easement described above is referenced in the Clifton Deed.
However, the Road Easement does not specifically include the SE % of the SE%
Section 19. The map attached to the Road Easement as Exhibit A depicts the road to
be just south of Section 19. However, the Timberland Survey shows tile reserved
private road easement crossing Section 19. As stated above, the road depicted on the
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Road Easement and one of the roads depicted on the Timberland Survey is Flat Creek
Road. The location of Flat Creek Road changed between the date the Road Easement
was recorded (November 6, 1970) and the date the Timberland Survey was completed
(August 1, 1971 ). The fact the location of Flat Creek Road changed slightly is
supported by Chris Thomason and Clarence Thomason, who witnessed Monty
Dickinson build what is now Flat Creek Road near the road that is depicted on the Road
Easement. However, an easement does not have to be in the exact location as
depicted on a map to be valid.
Pursuant to a Deed executed December 22, 1970, and recorded on May 20,
1982, Timberland conveyed the E

~

of the SE% of the SE% of Section 19 to Clifton.

This was the first subdivision of the SE% of the SE% of Section 19 by Timberland. As
set forth in the Deed, the conveyance to Clifton was subject to: "Easement of Record,
which allows joint usage of a road over and across the described property and adjacent
property which runs with the land, for ingress and egress from the described property
as recorded November 6, 1970 in Book 154 of Miscellaneous Records, Page 394,
records of Benewah County, Idaho ... "
Clifton received a packet of information from Timberland before he purchased
the property. Clifton's packet was similar to that received by Kris Jones. The packet
received by Kris Jones clearly stated that the property was to be access via private
roads and included in the packet was a map showing the location of the proposed
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private roads. The information contained within the Timberland packet is evidence of
Timberland's intention to encumber all of the properties with a private road easement.
Despite the fact the Road Easement referenced in Clifton's Deed did not include
Section 19, there is substantial and competent evidence to demonstrate that it was the
intention of Timberland to encumber Clifton's property with a road easement for ingress
and egress for the benefit of adjacent property, including the Ryan and Jones property.
The very language of the Deed itself put Clifton on notice of the existence ot an
easement across his property. Why would the easement language be contained in
Clifton's Deed if Timberland had no intention to encumber Clifton's property with an
easement? Had Clifton's deed been devoid of any language regarding an easement,
then perhaps Clifton could claim he was unaware of the fact that his property was
encumbered by an easement. However, the the language in Clifton's Deed clearly
states his property is encumbered by an easement. It was Timberland's intention to
encumber Clifton's property with an easement. It was a scrivener's error on the part of
Timberland which must have referenced the Road Easement in the Clifton Deed as
opposed to the easement language which is contained in the Dickinson and Jones
Deeds.
Clifton knew when he looked at the property offered for sale by Timberland that
all of the lots were to be accessed by private roads (Tr. Vol. I, P. 110, Ln. 9-25; Tr. Vol.
I, P. 111, Ln.1-2). Clifton knew when he purchased his property that his property was
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subject to an easement (Tr. Vol. I, P. 104, Ln. 9-11). However, now, Clifton claims that
it is not.
Compounding the scrivener's error is the fact that Clifton did not record his Deed
until 1982, approximately twelve years after the Deed was executed (Ryan Exhibit G
and Machado Exhibit 1). As a result, Jones and Dickinson had no way of knowing that
Clifton's Deed contained an error. If Clifton had recorded his Deed, Jones and
Dickinson could have checked the public records to determine the status of the access
to their respective parcels. Clifton's dilatory recording should not inure to his benefit.
There is substantial and competent evidence that Timberland's intent to
encumber Clifton's property (now the Machado and Clifton property) with an access
easement to the Ryan and Jones property is demonstrated by Timberland's next
subdivision of the SE% of the SE% of Section 19. Pursuant to a deed executed on
February 16, 1971, and recorded on July 31, 1978, Timberland conveyed the J\JW % of
the SE% of the SE% to Jones. The conveyance to Jones was subject to: "Access to
this property is by a private road which extends from the public road and crosses this
tract to provide access to other lands in Section 19. The grantor reserves an easement
for said road across the tract for use by other landowners in this section.

."

Again, the intention of Timberland is clear. Access to the Jones Property is via a
private road easement, which provides access to the Jones Property and other property
within Section 19. The public road referred to in the Deed is U.S. Alt. Highway 95, now
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Highway 3. The private road is that depicted on the Timberland Survey and on the
Machado Survey as Shamrock Lane. The Jones Property is landlocked. Without an
easement over and across the E

~

of the SE% of the SE% of Section 19, Jones has

no reasonable way to access his property. The only means to give effect to the
language contained within the Jones Deed is to find there is a road easement across
the E

~

of the SE % of the SE% of Section 19. Furthermore, it is then logical to

conclude that the private road referred to in the Jones Deed is the private road depicted
in the Timberland Survey and the Machado Survey.
In addition, and as stated above, Timberland specifically informed Jones,
through a written description of the Jones parcel, and through a map, that access to the
Jones parcel was to be via a private road, which is in the approximate location of
Shamrock Lane.
On August 1, 1971, a Record of Survey commissioned by Timberland was
completed. The Record of Survey clearly indicates the existence of "private road easement reserved" across the Clifton Property, the Machado Property and the Ryan
Property. The location of the easements are in the same location as Flat Creek Road
and Shamrock Lane. The Record of Survey also states that" ... the described property
and the data recorded hereon is an accurate representation of said property." The
location of Shamrock Lane as depicted on the Timberland Survey is in approximately
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the same location as the private road that is depicted in the map Jones received from
Timberland.
Pursuant to a Deed recorded September 10, 1971, Timberland conveyed what is
now the Ryan Property to Ryan's predecessor in interest, Monty Dickinson. Mr.
Dickinson built Flat Creek Road and Shamrock Lane. The Deed states, in part:
"Access to this property is by a private road which extends from the public road. This
road crosses this tract to provide access to other lands, and the grantor reserves an
easement for this road." As above, the intention of Timberland is clear, access to the
Ryan Property is via a private road, which extends from the public road and said private
road runs over and across adjacent property in the SE % of the SE % of Section 19. As
above, the private road referred to is depicted in the Timberland Survey and such
private road is now known as Flat Creek Road and Shamrock Lane. Therefore, Ryan
has an express easement for ingress and egress to the Ryan Property.
Pursuant to a deed executed on September 25, 2006, and recorded on
September 28, 2006, Clifton conveyed the NE% of the SE % of the SE% of Section 19
to Machado. The Machado Deed states the conveyance is subject to: "all easements,
rights of ways, covenants, restrictions, reservations ... of record ... " and that the
premises is free from all encumbrances except" ... easements of record and
easements visible upon the premises ... " Machado had actual knowledge of the
easement across his property prior to his purchase from Clifton.
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As set forth in the Road Easement, the road now known as Fiat Creek Road has
been in existence and use on or before October 13, 1970 (the date the Road Easement
was executed). Furthermore, pursuant to the Record of Survey and the statements of
Chris Thomason and Clarence Thomason, the road now known as Shamrock Lane had
been in use and existence since on or before the Spring of 1971
It should be noted that the first parcel Timberland severed frorn the SE % of the
SE % of Section 19 was Clifton's, and that said parcel was the entire E 1h of the SE %
of the SE% of Section 19. If the Court concludes Clifton and Machado's argument that
the easement language in Clifton's Deed does not pertain to the remaining portion of
the SE% of the SE % of Section 19 is correct, the practical effect of such a conclusion
would be that at the time of the conveyance to Clifton, Timberland cut off their own
access to the remaining property in the SE % of the SE'% of Section 19. That is not a
logical conclusion to make. Why would Timberland convey a portion of the SE % of the
SE % of Section 19 to Clifton and thereby cut off their access to the remainder of the
SE % of the SE% of Section 19? Timberland would not, and did not, cut off their own
access to the remainder of the SE % of the SE % of Section 19 by their conveyance of
the E 1h of the SE % of the SE % of Section 19 to Clifton. This is especially true in light
of the map given to Jones, which depicts a private road accessing said remainder and
the private road easements depicted on the Timberland Survey.
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Idaho Code § 55-603 provides that the grantor of property retains an easement
over the property granted to access the remainder of the grantor's property. If, as
argued by Clifton and Machado, the conveyance from Timberland to Clifton in the
Clifton Deed did not contain an express easement for access to the Ryan and Jones
Properties, would not Timberland, pursuant to the legal principal set forth in Idaho Code
§ 55-603, have reserved to Timberland an access easement across the Clifton Property

to access what is now the Ryan and Jones Properties? Clearly the answer is yes.
The relevant deeds and documents of record pertaining to the SE % of the SE 1/i
of Section 19, the statements of Chris and Clarence Thomason, and the literature and
maps given to Jones by Timberland, when read together, all lead to one conclusion.
Timberland intended to encumber the property within the SE% of the SE% of Section
19 with reciprocal private road easements for access. Therefore, there is substantial
and competent evidence that Ryan and Jones have an express easement over and
across the Clifton Property and the Machado Property for ingress and egress upon
what is now known as Shamrock Lane.

3.

The District Court's finding of the width of the easement and the
snow removal easement is supported by competent evidence.

In Abbott v. Nampa School Dist., 131, 119 Idaho 544,808 P.2d 1289 (Idaho

1991), this Court stated:
It is well established in this jurisdiction that an easement is the right to use
the land of another for a specific purpose that is not inconsistent with the
general use of the property by the owner. Sinnett v. Werelus, 83 Idaho
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514, 365 P.2d 952 (1961). In Coulsen v. Aberdeen-Springfield Canal
Co., 47 Idaho 619, 277 P. 542 (1929), this Court stated:
The use to which a right of way is devoted or for which it is
created, determines the character of title with which the
holder is invested. The character of the use or the necessity
of complete dominion determines the extent to which he is
entitled to possession. No greater title or right to possession
passes under a general grant than reasonably necessary to
enable the grantee to adequately and conveniently make the
intended use of his way.
Thus, the general rule concerning easements is that the right of an
easement holder may not be enlarged and may not encompass more than
is necessary to fulfill the easement. Id. In Merrill v. Penrod, 109 Idaho
46, 704 P.2d 950 (Ct.App.1985), the Idaho Court of Appeals observed
that an easement does not include the right to enlarge the use to the
injury of the servient land.
The use of an easement claimed under a grant or reservation must be
confined strictly to the purposes for which it was granted or reserved, and
in compliance with any restrictions imposed by the terms of the
instrument. Where the grant or reservation of an easement is general in
its terms, use of the easement includes those uses which are incidental or
necessary to the reasonable and proper enjoyment of the easement, but
is limited to those that burden the servient estate as little as possible. In
other words, an easement granted or reserved in general terms, without
any limitations as to its use, is one of unlimited reasonable use. It is not
restricted to use merely for such purposes of the dominant estate as are
reasonably required at the time of the grant or reservation, but the right
may be exercised by the dominant owner for those purposes to which that
estate may be subsequently devoted. Thus, there may be an increase in
the volume and kind of use of such an easement during the course of its
enjoyment. 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements and Licenses§ 74, pp. 479-80
(1966).
The degree of change that will be allowed in the use of an easement
differs with the manner in which the easement was conveyed, the
language of conveyance, and the use of the servient estate before and
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after the conveyance. See 5 Restatement of Property§ 483, p. 3010
(1944).
In Boydstun Beach Ass'n v. Allen, 111 Idaho 370, 723 P.2d 914
(Ct.App.1986), the Idaho Court of Appeals applied the following rule to an
easement: "The rule is that, absent language in the easement to the
contrary, the uses made by the servient and dominant owners may be
adjusted consistent with the normal development of their respective
lands." 111 Idaho at 378, 723 P.2d at 922.
There is substantial and competent evidence in the record that the property in
question was once owned by Timberland, that the property had been previously logged,
that Timberland was selling ten acre parcels, and that Timberland intended each ten
acre parcel to be access via private roads, that Timberland's marketing information
relative to the ten acre parcels described "building sites" on the various parcels, and
that the marketing information generally described the properties as beinfJ suitable for
residential purposes (Ryan Exhibits KKK, LLL, MMM, NNN, 000, and PPP). The
inescapable conclusion is that the ten acre parcels were being marketed and sold for
residential use. Residential use of property requires year round access. Year round
access in an area where snow falls requires the ability to remove snow from the road
surface.
There is substantial and competent evidence in the record which reflects that
Montee Dickinson at the direction of Timberland, placed roads on the properties for
access, including Shamrock Lane for access to the Ryan and ,Jones propfHiies. There
is substantial and competent evidence in the record that the easement granted is
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general in nature in that it does not describe the width of the easement or snow
removal.
Furthermore, there is substantial and competent evidence in the record vvhich
supports the conclusion that a substantial amount of snow falls in the area of Shamrock
Lane each winter resulting in snow banks as high as five feet alongside Shamrock
Lane.
Shamrock Lane was constructed for residential use of the F<.yan and Jones
properties. Shamrock Lane was constructed in a region which receives heavy snowfall
each winter. It is necessary to remove snow from Shamrock Lane during the winter to
access the Ryan and Jones properties. There is substantial and competent evidence to
support the Court's finding of the necessary width of the snow removal easement (Tr.
Vol. I, P. 885, Ln. 12-25; Ryan Exhibit AAA; Tr. Vol. I, P. 893, Ln. 15-25) and that Ryan
has historically plowed snow between the trees on Clifton and Machado's property (Tr.
Vol. I, P. 926, Ln. 1-17).
The Transcript herein is inaccurate when is states that Ryan testified that he
intends to remove trees from within the snow removal easement (Tr. VoL I, P. 924, Ln.
16-20). Ryan intends to file a Motion, pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 30.1 (b) and 32
to correct the Transcript.
There is substantial and competent evidence in the record to support the
conclusion that development in the Shamrock Lane area has been slow and that the
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use of Shamrock Lane has been consistent with the normal development of the land.
Furthermore, the removal of snow from Shamrock Lane is a necessary and incidental to
the use of the easement. Without the ability to remove snow from Shamrock Lane and
place some of the same on the Clifton and Machado properties, Ryan and Jones will
not have the ability to reasonably and property enjoy the proper use of the easement.
There is substantial and competent evidence that the width of the travel portion
of Shamrock Lane in 1972 was 12-14 feet in width with two foot wide ditches on each
side of the travel portion of the roadway (Tr. Vol. I, P. 441, Ln. 15-25; TR Vol. I, P. 442,
Ln. 1-25; Tr. Vol. I, P. 443, Ln. 1-18).
Clifton and Machado attempt to discredit the testimony in this regard as it
occurred after a lunch break. There is nothing in the record to evidence that the
testimony was fabricated or not credible. If there is any lack of credibility, it lies with
Clifton who was drunk when he purchased his property in 1970, and had not returned to
check on it until 1994 (Tr. Vol. II, P. 1060, Ln. 1-16), did not know the location of Flat
Creek Road in December of 1970 (Tr. Vol. I, P. 94, Ln. 2-6), claimed to have been
shown the property by a representative for Timberland before Timberland even owned
the property (Tr. Vol. I, P. 94, Ln. 10-25; Tr. Vol. I, P. 95, Ln. 1-14), and that he was not
sure of any of the dates he testified to and was testifying in generalities (Tr. Vol 1, P. 95,
Ln. 1-25; Tr. Vol. I. P. 96, Ln. 1-12). Furthermore, Clifton testified that there were no
roads on his property when he purchased it. Conversely, the owner of Clifton's property
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to the north stated that a road accessing said neighbor's property located on Clifton's
property had been in existence since the 1950's.
There is substantial and competent evidence to support the Court's finding on
the width of the access easement and the necessity and width of the snow removal
easement.
4.

The District Court erred in failing to rule on the claims of prescriptive
easement and easement implied by prior use.

In Kolar v. Cassia County Idaho, 142 Idaho 346, 127 P.3d 962 (Idaho 2005)
this Court stated:
To properly preserve an issue for appeal, the one must either receive an
adverse ruling on the issue or raise it in the court below. See McPheters
v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 397, 64 P.3d 317, 323 (2003). The district court
never ruled on the due process claim; thus the question becomes whether
the issue was properly raised. This, in turn, depends upon what the
meaning of the word "raised" is. The Court recognizes a distinction
between issues not formally raised and issues that "never surfaced"
below. Manookian v. Blaine County, 112 Idaho 697, 700, 735 P.2d
1008, 1011 (1987). Issues not formally raised may be considered if they
are tried by the express or implied consent of the parties, Idaho R Civ. P.
15(b); issues never raised will not be considered, Manookian, 112 Idaho
at 700, 735 P.2d at 1011.
More recently, in Miner v. Miner, 37069 (IDCCA) January 27, 2011. an
unpublished opinion, this Court stated:
Generally, an issue will not be considered on appeal unless the record
shows an adverse ruling that forms the basis for an assignment of error.
That principle does not apply, however, where the trial court failed to rule
on an issue despite a party's diligent efforts to obtain a ruling. See Kolar
v. Cassia County Idaho, 142 Idaho 346, 354, 127 P.3d 962, 970 (2005)
(holding that because the district court had never ruled on the issue being
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raised on appeal, the next inquiry was whether the issue was properly
raised because "[t]o properly preserve an issue for appeal, the [sic] one
must either receive an adverse ruling on the issue or raise it in the court
below." (emphasis added)). In this case, Clarice unambiguously and
thoroughly presented her request for discovery violation sanctions, first in
her motion to compel discovery and later in her written closing argument.
Therefore, we will consider this issue on appeal.
For reasons unknown, the District Court failed to rule on Ryan and Jones' theory
of Easement Implied by Prior Use and Ryan's theory of Prescriptive Easement. Both of
which were set forth in the pleadings, brief, and argued (R..Vol. I, P. 38-40; R. Vol. I, P.
152-154; R. Vol. I, P. 169-171; Tr. Vol. I, P. 16, Ln. 12-17; Tr. Vol. I, P. 22, Ln.7-11, Tr.
Vol. I, P. 23, Ln 5-8). Should this Court decide that the District Court was correct in
finding that Ryan and Jones have an Express Easement and/or an Implied Easement
by Necessity, then it is necessary to address the alternative theories of Easement
Implied by Prior Use and Prescriptive Easement.

a.

Easement Implied by Prior Use

In Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 991 P.2d 362 (1999) the Idaho Supreme
Court stated:
In order to establish an implied easement by prior use, the party seeking
to establish the easement must demonstrate three essential elements: (1)
unity of title or ownership and subsequent separation by grant of the
dominant estate; (2) apparent continuous use long enough before
separation of the dominant estate to show that the use was intended to be
permanent; and (3) the easement must be reasonably necessary to the
proper enjoyment of the dominant estate. See Bear Island Water Ass'n,
125 Idaho at 725, 874 P.2d at 536; Close, 95 Idaho at 76, 501 P.2d at
1387; Davis v. Gowen, 83 Idaho 204, 210, 360 P.2d 403, 406-07 (1961).
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In Davis the Court went on to state:
... [T]he well-established rule is that, unlike an easement by way of
necessity, an implied easement by prior use is not later extinguished if the
easement is no longer reasonably necessary. This long standing rule is
based on the theory that when someone conveys property, they also
intend to convey whatever is required for the beneficial use and
enjoyment of that property, and intends to retain all that is required for the
use and enjoyment of the land retained. Consequently, an easement
implied by prior use is a true easement of a permanent duration, rather
than a temporary easement which exists only as long as the necessity
continues. See, e.g., Norken v. McGahan, 823 P.2d 622, 631 (Alaska

1991); Thompson v. Schuh, 286 Or. 201,593 P.2d 1138, 1145 (1979);
Story v. Hefner, 540 P.2d 562, 566 (Okla.1975). Additionally, an implied
easement by prior use is appurtenant to the land and therefore passes
with all subsequent conveyances of the dominant and servient estates.
See Hughes v. State, 80 Idaho 286, 328 P.2d 397 (1958); I.C. § 55-603
(stating that a transfer o'f real property also includes all easements
attached to the property).
In Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635, 132 P.Jd 392 (2006), the Idaho Supreme
Court stated:
Strict necessity is not required for the creation of an implied easement by
prior use. All that is required is reasonable necessity. Because the implied
easement from prior use is created at the time of severance, the issue of
reasonable necessity is based upon the circumstances that existed at that
time. A later change in circumstances is not relevant to the creation o'f the
easement.
The Court in Thomas went on to find that:
Madsen argues that part o'f Thomas's property borders the public highway
and therefore it was not landlocked. He could have simply built another
access road. Because an implied easement from prior use requires only
reasonable necessity, not great present necessity, there is no requirement
that the dominant estate be landlocked. Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho
637, 991 P.2d 362 (1999). Thomas testified that because of the wet
conditions in his adjoining field much of the year, he would have to build
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quite a foundation for a new road. The district judge found "that
constructing a road of the same quality would require considerable
expense and time." The district judge viewed the premises and therefore
had the advantage of correlating the evidence to the actual situation on the
ground. It was for him to balance the respective convenience,
inconvenience, costs, and other pertinent facts.

In Akers v. Mortensen, 2009-ID-0126.104, Docket Nos. 33587, 33694 (January
2009), the Idaho Supreme Court defined "reasonable necessity" and stated:
In Akers I, we limited the scope of the remand to one of three elements
needed to establish an implied easement from prior use. 142 Idaho at 301,
127 P.3d at 204. In order to prove the existence of an implied easement by
prior use, a party must show: (1) unity of title or ownership and subsequent
separation by grant of the dominant estate; (2) apparent continuous use
long enough before separation of the dominant estate to show that the use
was intended to be permanent; and (3) that the easement must be
reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment of the dominant estate. Id.
"'[R]easonable necessity is something less than the great present
necessity required for an easement implied by necessity. Beach Lateral
111

Water Users Ass'n v. Harrison, 142 Idaho 600,605, 130 P.3d 1138,
1143 (2006) (quoting Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637,643,991 P.2d
362, 368 (1999)). Because an implied easement from prior use arises at
the time of severance, the issue of reasonable necessity is based upon the
circumstances that existed at that time. Akers I, 142 Idaho at 302, 127
P.3d at 205 (citing Davis, 133 Idaho at 642, 991 P.2d at 367). When
deciding the issue of reasonable necessity, the court should "balance !he
relative situations pro and con, as to the respective convenience,
inconvenience, costs and all other pertinent, connected facts." Eisenbarth
v. Delp, 70 Idaho 266, 270, 215 P.2d 812, 814 (1950) (citations omitted).
Although Eisenbarth involved a private condemnation action under I.C. §
7-701 (5), its analysis of reasonable necessity required for the private
condemnation of a road is also applicable to the reasonable necessity
required for an implied easement by prior use. Thomas v. Madsen, 142

Idaho 635, 639, 132 P.3d 392, 396 n. 3 (2006).
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Clearly, the first element of an easement implied by prior use is met in this case.
As set forth above, the entirety of the SE % of the SE % was owned by Timberland at
one point in time.
The second element of an easement implied by prior use requires evidence of
continuous use long enough before separation of the dominant estate to show the use
was intended to be permanent. There is substantial and competent evidence to support
a finding that the dominant estates are the Ryan Property and the Jones Property. As
set forth above, the Ryan property was subdivided from the SE% of the SE% via a
conveyance from Timberland to Dickinson executed on September 2, 1971. Also set
forth above, the Jones Property was severed from the SE % of the SE % pursuant to a
deed executed on February 16, 1971, and recorded on July 31, 1978. Therefore, the
use of Flat Creek Road and Shamrock Lane as a means to access the Ryan Propefty
and the Jones Property prior to September 2, 1971, is at issue. \/Vith respect to Flat
Creek Road, there can be no doubt Timberland used Flat Creek Road to access the SE
% of the SE % of Section 19. Exhibit A to the Road Easement is a map generated from
an aerial photograph dated September 16, 1965. Clearly the use of Flat Creek road to
access the SE % of the SE % of Section 19 was of a duration sufficient to satisfy the
second element of an easement implied by prior use.
The use of the portion of Shamrock Lane that runs in a north/south direction had
been used by Forrest Anderson since the 1950's. The use of the portion of Shamrock
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Lane which turned down to the Ryan and Jones Properties was admittedly used for a
shorter period of time. Chris Thomason and Clarence Thomason state they used
Shamrock Lane in the Spring of 1971. The Timberland Survey depicts Shamrock Lane
and states the same had been in existence prior to August 1971. Therefore, Shamrock
Lane was in existence and being used prior to the severance of the Ryan and Jones
parcels from the Timberland parent parcel. However, that does not end the inquiry.
The second element of an easement implied by prior use requires evidence of
sufficient use of the easement to evidence the use of the easement was intended to be
permanent. It is suggested by Ryan and Jones that evidence of the use of the
easement is not the only means to evidence the fact the easement was intended to be
permanent. In this case, not only is there evidence of use of the easement, but there is
documentary evidence that the use of the easement to access the Ryan Property and
the Jones Property via Flat Creek Road and Shamrock Lane was intended to be
permanent. That documentary evidence is the literature and maps which Jones
received from Timberland indicating access to the property at issue herein would be via
private road and depicting the location of said road where Shamrock Lane lies today,
and the Timberland Survey, which identifies what are now known as Flat Creek Road
and Shamrock Lane as "Private road - Easement reserved". Therefore, the second
element of an easement implied by prior use is satisfied.
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The final element of an easement implied by prior use requires the easement be
reasonably necessary for the proper enjoyment of the dominant estate. Ryan and their
predecessors in interest, and Jones, have used Flat Creek Road and Shamrock Lane to
access the Ryan Property and the Jones Property since the respective properties were
severed from the SE% of the SE% of Section 19. The Ryans have oriented their
residence in conformity with the location of Shamrock Lane. Carol Ryan and Chuck
Ryan state that Shamrock Lane is the only access to the Ryan Property.
The fact that Flat Creek Road crosses the Ryan Property and Ryan and Jones
should be required to access their respective parcels from Flat Creek Road is not
reasonable for the reasons cited herein.
Ryan and Jones have no other reasonable means to access their respective
property other than via Shamrock Lane. Without the use of Shamrock Lane, the Jones
Property is landlocked. As a result, it is not only reasonably necessary for Jones to use
Shamrock Lane, but is it an absolute necessity for Jones to use Shamrock Lane to be
able to enjoy the full use of the Jones Property.
Ryan and Jones have an easement implied by prior use for access to the Ryan
Property and the Jones Property over and across the Clifton Property and the Machado
Property.
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b.

Prescriptive Easement

Recently in Backman v. Lawrence, 2009-10-0513.098, Docket No. 35151 (May
2009), the Idaho Supreme Court reiterated the legal standard for a claim of prescriptive
easement and stated:
A party seeking to establish the existence of an easement by prescription
must prove by clear and convincing evidence that use of the subject
property is: "(1) open and notorious, (2) continuous and uninterrupted, (3)
adverse and under a claim of right, (4) with the actual or imputed
knowledge of the owner of the servient tenement (5) for the statutory
period of five years." Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474,480,129 P.3d
1223, 1229 (2006).
A determination that a claimant has established a prescriptive easement
involves entwined questions of law and fact. Beckstead v. Price, 146
Idaho 57, _ , 190 P.3d 876, 880 (2008). "Each element is essential to
the claim, and the trial court must make findings relevant to each element
in order to sustain a judgment on appeal." Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho
225, 229, 76 P.3d 969, 973 (2003). It is the province of the trial court to
determine whether the plaintiffs presented "reasonably clear and
convincing evidence" of each of the five elements. Roberts v. Swim, 117
Idaho 9, 12-13, 784 P.2d 339, 342-43 (Ct. App. 1989).
As set forth above, pursuant to a Deed executed on December 22, 1970, and
recorded on May 20, 1982, Timberland conveyed the E Yi of the SE% of the SE% of
Section 19 to Clifton.
Chris Thomason and Clarence Thomason state that Monty Dickinson had built
Shamrock Lane upon the Clifton property in, or before, the Spring of 1971. As such,
Timberland, by and through their agent, Monty Dickinson, was conducting acts meeting
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the definition of acts supporting a claim of prescriptive easement since the Spring of
1971.
Chris Thomason and Clarence Thomason state they have used Shamrock Lane
for hunting, horse riding and snowmobiling, Chris assisted Moak (who bought the Ryan
Property from Dickinson) to move a manufactured home onto the Ryan Property via
Shamrock Lane, Moaks resided in the manufactured home and used Shamrock Lane to
access the Ryan Parcel, and Chris used Shamrock Lane to access the Ryan Parcel to
check on the Moak manufactured home prior to Ryans' purchase of the property.
While the Moaks were absent from their property for a period of time, their
agents, Clarence Thomason, Chris Thomason, Robert Loe and Keith Wilson all traveled
over and across Shamrock Lane to the Moak residence to check on the condition of the
property.
Ryans obtained title to their real property pursuant to a Deed recorded on
February 23, 1989. Prior to purchasing the property, the Ryans state they used
Shamrock Lane to inspect the property. The Ryans state that after their purchase of the
property, they used Shamrock Lane to access the property initially as a vacation
property and ultimately as their primary residence.
The use of Shamrock Lane by Timberland (through their agent, Monty Dickinson),
by Dickinson himself after obtaining title, by Moak, by Ryan, and by members of the
community, including but not limited to, Chris Thomason and Clarence Thomason, was
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open and notorious, was continuous and uninterrupted, was adverse and under a claim
of right, with the actual or imputed knowledge of Clifton for the statutory period.
Therefore, Ryan has a prescriptive easement over and across the Clifton and Machado
Property to access the Ryan Property.

V.
CONCLUSION
It should not be overlooked that the District Court conducted a "view" of the roads
and property in question herein to orient itself relative to the evidence and testimony that
had been presented (Tr. Vol. II, P. 1363, Ln. 24-25; Tr. Vol. 11, P. 1364, Ln. 1-19).
Based upon said evidence and testimony, and orienting the same through the "view", the
District Court determined that Ryan and Jones have an express easement and an
easement implied by necessity over the Clifton Machado property 14 feet in width and
that Ryan and Jones have a snow removal easement of 15 feet. There is substantial
and competent evidence in the record to support this finding. Thus, the inquiry should
end there and Ryan and Jones should prevail on appeal.
Should this Court conclude otherwise, then, and only then does it become
necessary to consider Ryan and Jones' theory of easement implied by prior use and
Ryan's theory of prescriptive easement. It is presumed that in such case, this Court
would remand the matter to the District Court to make findings of facts and conclusions
of law with respect to the same.
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